DRACO: Byzantine-resilient Distributed Training via Redundant Gradients by Chen, Lingjiao et al.
DRACO:
Byzantine-resilient Distributed Training via Redundant
Gradients
Lingjiao Chen, Hongyi Wang, Zachary Charles, Dimitris Papailiopoulos
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Abstract
Distributed model training is vulnerable to byzantine system failures and adversarial compute nodes,
i.e., nodes that use malicious updates to corrupt the global model stored at a parameter server (PS). To
guarantee some form of robustness, recent work suggests using variants of the geometric median as an
aggregation rule, in place of gradient averaging. Unfortunately, median-based rules can incur a prohibitive
computational overhead in large-scale settings, and their convergence guarantees often require strong
assumptions. In this work, we present DRACO, a scalable framework for robust distributed training that
uses ideas from coding theory. In DRACO, each compute node evaluates redundant gradients that are
used by the parameter server to eliminate the effects of adversarial updates. DRACO comes with problem-
independent robustness guarantees, and the model that it trains is identical to the one trained in the
adversary-free setup. We provide extensive experiments on real datasets and distributed setups across a
variety of large-scale models, where we show that DRACO is several times, to orders of magnitude faster
than median-based approaches.
1 Introduction
Distributed and parallel implementations of stochastic optimization algorithms have become the de facto
standard in large-scale model training [LAP+14, RRWN11, ZCL15, AWD10, ABC+16, CLL+15, PGCC17,
CSAK14]. Due to increasingly common malicious attacks, hardware and software errors [CL+99, KAD+07,
BGS+17, CSX17], protecting distributed machine learning against adversarial attacks and failures has become
increasingly important. Unfortunately, even a single adversarial node in a distributed setup can introduce
arbitrary bias and inaccuracies to the end model[BGS+17].
A recent line of work [BGS+17, CSX17] studies this problem under a synchronous training setup, where
compute nodes evaluate gradient updates and ship them to a parameter server (PS) which stores and
updates the global model. Many of the aforementioned work use median-based aggregation, including
the geometric median (GM) instead of averaging in order to make their computations more robust. The
advantage of median-based approaches is that they can be robust to up to a constant fraction of the compute
nodes being adversarial [CSX17]. However, in large data settings, the cost of computing the geometric
median can dwarf the cost of computing a batch of gradients [CSX17], rendering it impractical. Furthermore,
proofs of convergence for such systems require restrictive assumptions such as convexity, and need to be
re-tailored to each different training algorithm. A scalable distributed training framework that is robust
against adversaries and can be applied to a large family of training algorithms (e.g., mini-batch SGD, GD,
coordinate descent, SVRG, etc.) remains an open problem.
In this paper, we instead use ideas from coding theory to ensure robustness during distributed training.
We present DRACO, a general distributed training framework that is robust against adversarial nodes and
worst-case compute errors. We show that DRACO can resist any s adversarial compute nodes during training
and returns a model identical to the one trained in the adversary-free setup. This allows DRACO to come with
“black-box” convergence guarantees, i.e., proofs of convergence in the adversary-free setup carry through
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Figure 1: The high level idea behind DRACO’s algorithmic redundancy. Suppose we have 4 data points
x1, . . . ,x4, and let gi be the gradient of the model with respect to data point xi. Instead of having each
compute node i evaluate a single gradient gi, DRACO assigns each node redundant gradients. In this
example, the replication ratio is 3, and the parameter server can recover the sum of the gradients from any
2 of the encoded gradient updates. Thus, the PS can still recover the sum of gradients in the presence of
an adversary. This can be done through a majority vote on all 6 pairs of encoded gradient updates. This
intuitive idea does not scale to a large number of compute nodes. DRACO implements a more systematic
and efficient encoding and decoding mechanism that scales to any number of machines.
to the adversarial setup with no modification, unlike prior median-based approaches [BGS+17, CSX17].
Moreover, in median-based approaches such as [BGS+17, CSX17], the median computation may dominate
the overall training time. In DRACO, most of the computational effort is carried through by the compute
nodes. This key factor allows our framework to offer up to orders of magnitude faster convergence in real
distributed setups.
To design DRACO, we borrow ideas from coding theory and algorithmic redundancy. In standard
adversary-free distributed computation setups, during each distributed round, each of the P compute
nodes processes B/P gradients and ships their sum to the parameter server. In DRACO, each compute
node processes rB/P gradients and sends a linear combination of those to the PS. Thus, DRACO incurs a
computational redundancy ratio of r. While this may seem sub-optimal, we show that under a worst-case
adversarial setup, it is information–theoretically impossible to design a system that obtains identical models
to the adversary–free setup with less redundancy. Upon receiving the P gradient sums, the PS uses a
“decoding” function to remove the effect of the adversarial nodes and reconstruct the original desired sum of
the B gradients. With redundancy ratio r, we show that DRACO can tolerate up to (r− 1)/2 adversaries,
which is information–theoretically tight. See Fig. 1 for a toy example of DRACO’s functionality.
We present two encoding and decoding techniques for DRACO. The encoding schemes are based on
the fractional repetition code and cyclic repetition code presented in [TLDK17, RTTD17]. In contrast to
previous work on stragglers and gradient codes [TLDK17, RTTD17, CPE17], our decoders are tailored to
the adversarial setting and use different methods. Our decoding schemes utilize an efficient majority vote
decoder and a novel Fourier decoding technique.
Compared to median-based techniques that can tolerate approximately a constant fraction of “average
case” adversaries, DRACO’s (r− 1)/2 bound on the number of “worst-case” adversaries may be significantly
smaller. However, in realistic regimes where only a constant number of nodes are malicious, DRACO is
significantly faster as we show in experiments in Section 4.
We implement DRACO in PyTorch and deploy it on distributed setups on Amazon EC2, where we
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compare against median-based training algorithms on several real world datasets and various ML models.
We show that DRACO is up to orders of magnitude faster compared to GM-based approaches across a range
of neural networks, e.g., LeNet, VGG-19, AlexNet, ResNet-18, and ResNet-152, and always converges to the
correct adversary-free model, while in some cases median-based approaches do not converge.
Related Work The large-scale nature of modern machine learning has spurred a great deal of novel
research on distributed and parallel training algorithms and systems [RRWN11, DCM+12, AGL+17, JST+14,
LWR+14, MPP+15, CPM+16]. Much of this work focuses on developing and analyzing efficient distributed
training algorithms. This work shares ideas with federated learning, in which training is distributed among a
large number of compute nodes without centralized training data [KMR15, KMY+16, BIK+16].
Synchronous training can suffer from straggler nodes [ZKJ+08], where a few compute nodes are signifi-
cantly slower than average. While early work on straggler mitigation used techniques such as job replication
[SLR16], more recent work has employed coding theory to speed up distributed machine learning systems
[LLP+17, LMAA15, DCG16, DCG17, RPPA17, YGK17]. One notable technique is gradient coding, a straggler
mitigation method proposed in [TLDK17], which uses codes to speed up synchronous distributed first-order
methods [RTTD17, CPE17, CSSS11]. Our work builds on and extends this work to the adversarial setup
[CWCP18, CWP18]. Mitigating adversaries can often be more difficult than mitigating stragglers since in the
adversarial setup we have no knowledge as to which nodes are the adversaries.
The topic of byzantine fault tolerance has been extensively studied since the early 80s [LSP82]. There
has been substantial amounts of work recently on byzantine fault tolerance in distributed training which
shows that while average-based gradient methods are susceptible to adversarial nodes [BGS+17, CSX17],
median-based update methods can achieve good convergence while being robust to adversarial nodes.
Both [BGS+17] and [CSX17] use variants of the geometric median to improve the tolerance of first-order
methods against adversarial nodes. Unfortunately, convergence analyses of median approaches often require
restrictive assumptions and algorithm-specific proofs of convergence. Furthermore, the geometric median
aggregation may dominate the training time in large-scale settings.
The idea of using redundancy to guard against failures in computational systems has existed for decades.
Von Neumann used redundancy and majority vote operations in boolean circuits to achieve accurate
computations in the presence of noise with high probability [VN56]. These results were further extended in
work such as [Pip88] to understand how susceptible a boolean circuit is to randomly occurring failures. Our
work can be seen as an application of the aforementioned concepts to the context of distributed training in
the face of adversity.
2 Preliminaries
Notation In the following, we denote matrices and vectors in bold, and scalars and functions in standard
script. We let 1m denote the m× 1 all ones vector, while 1n×m denotes the all ones n×m matrix. We
define 0m,0n×m analogously. Given a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, we let Ai,j denote its entry at location (i, j),
Ai,· ∈ R1×m denote its ith row, and A·,j ∈ Rn×1 denote its jth column. Given S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m},
we let AS,T denote the submatrix of A where we keep rows indexed by S and columns indexed by T .
Given matrices A,B ∈ Rn×m, their Hadamard product, denoted AB, is defined as the n×m matrix where
(AB)i,j = Ai,jBi,j .
Distributed Training The process of training a model from data can be cast as an optimization problem
known as empirical risk minimization (ERM):
min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(w; xi)
where xi ∈ Rm represents the ith data point, n is the total number of data points, w ∈ Rd is a model, and
`(·; ·) is a loss function that measures the accuracy of the predictions made by the model on each data point.
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One way to approximately solve the above ERM is through stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which
operates as follows. We initialize the model at an initial point w0 and then iteratively update it according to
wk = wk−1 − γ∇`(wk−1; xik),
where ik is a random data-point index sampled from {1, . . . , n}, and γ > 0 is the learning rate.
In order to take advantage of distributed systems and parallelism, we often use mini-batch SGD. At each
iteration of mini-batch SGD, we select a random subset Sk ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of the data and update our model
according to
wk = wk−1 − γ|Sk|
∑
i∈Sk
∇`(wk−1; xi).
Many distributed versions of mini-batch SGD partition the gradient computations across the compute nodes.
After computing and summing up their assigned gradients, each nodes sends their respective sum back to
the PS. The PS aggregates these sums to update the model wk−1 according to the rule above.
In this work, we consider the question of how to perform this update method in a distributed and robust
manner. Fix a batch (or set of points) Sk, which after relabeling we assume equals {1, . . . ,B}. We will
denote ∇`(wk−1; xi) by gi. The fundamental question we consider in this work is how to compute
∑B
i=1 gi
in a distributed and adversary-resistant manner. We present DRACO, a framework that can compute this
summation in a distributed manner, even under the presence of adversaries.
Remark 1. In contrast to previous works, our analysis and framework are applicable to any distributed algorithm
which requires the sum of multiple functions. Notably, our framework can be applied to any first-order methods,
including gradient descent, SVRG [JZ13], coordinate descent, and projected or accelerated versions of these algorithms.
For the sake of simplicity, our discussion in the rest of the text will focus on mini-batch SGD.
Adversarial Compute Node Model We consider the setting where a subset of size s of the P compute
nodes act adversarially against the training process. The goal of an adversary can either be to completely
mislead the end model, or bias it towards specific areas of the parameter space. A compute node is considered
to be an adversarial node, if it does not return the prescribed gradient update given its allocated samples.
Such a node can ship back to the PS any arbitrary update of dimension equal to that of the true gradient.
Mini-batch SGD fails to converge even if there is only a single adversarial node [BGS+17].
In this work, we consider the strongest possible adversaries. We assume that each adversarial node has
access to infinite computational power, the entire data set, the training algorithm, and has knowledge of any
defenses present in the system. Furthermore, all adversarial nodes may collaborate with each other.
3 DRACO: Robust Distributed Training via Algorithmic Redundancy
In this section we present our main results for DRACO. The proofs are left to the appendix.
We generalize the scheme in Figure 1 to P compute nodes and B data samples. At each iteration of our
training process, we assign the B gradients to the P compute nodes using a P ×B allocation matrix A. Here,
Aj,k is 1 if node j is assigned the kth gradient gk, and 0 otherwise. The support of Aj,·, denoted supp (Aj,·),
is the set of indices k of gradients evaluated by the jth compute node. For simplicity, we will assume B = P
throughout the following.
DRACO utilizes redundant computations, so it is worth formally defining the amount of redundancy
incurred. This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 1. r , 1P ‖A‖0 denotes the redundancy ratio.
In other words, the redundancy ratio is the average number of gradients assigned to each compute node.
We define a d× P matrix G by G , [g1,g2, · · · ,gP ]. Thus, G has all assigned gradients as its columns.
The jth compute node first computes a d×P gradient matrix Yj , (1dAj,·)G using its allocated gradients.
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In particular, if the kth gradient gk is allocated to the jth compute node, i.e., Aj,k 6= 0, then the compute node
computes gk as the kth column of Yj . Otherwise, it sets the k-th column of Yj to be 0d.
The jth compute node is equipped with an encoding function Ej that maps the d× P matrix Yj of
its assigned gradients to a single d-dimensional vector. After computing its assigned gradients, the jth
compute node sends zj , Ej(Yj) to the PS. If the jth node is adversarial then it instead sends zj + nj to
the PS, where nj is an arbitrary d-dimensional vector. We let E be the set of local encoding functions, i.e.,
E = {E1,E2, · · · ,EP }.
Let us define a d×P matrix ZA,E,G by ZA,E,G , [z1,z2, · · · ,zP ], and a d×P matrix N by N, [n1,n2, · · · ,nP ].
Note that at most s columns of N are non-zero. Under this notation, after all updates are finished the PS
receives a d× P matrix R , ZA,E,G + N. The PS then computes a d-dimensional update gradient vector
u , D(R) using a decoder function D.
The system in DRACO is determined by the tuple (A,E,D). We decide how to assign gradients by
designing A, how each compute node should locally amalgamate its gradients by designing E, and how the
PS should decode the output by designing D. The process of DRACO is illustrated in Figure 2.
x1
x2
x3 x1
x2
x3
x4
x1
x2
Model Update
. . .
xP 1
xP
xP
E2 EP 1 EPE1
Compute nodes: Gradient Evaluations and Encoding	
At most    adversarial 
updates	
s
D
Parameter Sever: Decoding and Model Update	
Figure 2: In DRACO, each compute node is allocated a subset of the data set. Each compute node computes
redundant gradients, encodes them via Ei, and sends the resulting vector to the PS. These received vectors
then pass through a decoder that detects where the adversaries are and removes their effects from the
updates. The output of the decoder is the true sum of the gradients. The PS applies the updates to the
parameter model and we then continue to the next iteration.
This framework of (A,E,D) encompasses both distributed SGD and the GM approach. In distributed
mini-batch SGD, we assign 1 gradient to each compute node. After relabeling, we can assume that we assign
gi to compute node i. Therefore, A is simply the identity matrix IP . The matrix Yj therefore contains gj
in column j and 0 in all other columns. The local encoding function Ej simply returns gj by computing
Ej(Yj) = Yj1P = gj , which it then sends to the PS. The decoding function now depends on the algorithm.
For vanilla mini-batch SGD, the PS takes the average of the gradients, while in the GM approach, it takes a
geometric median of the gradients.
In order to guarantee convergence, we want DRACO to exactly recover the true sum of gradients,
regardless of the behavior of the adversarial nodes. In other words, we want DRACO to protect against
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worst-case adversaries. Formally, we want the PS to always obtain the d-dimensional vector G1P via DRACO
with any s adversarial nodes. Below is the formal definition.
Definition 2. DRACO with (A,E,D) can tolerate s adversarial nodes, if for any N = [n1,n2, · · · ,nP ] such that
|{j : nj 6= 0}| ≤ s, we have D(ZA,E,G + N) = G1P .
Remark 2. If we can successfully defend against s adversaries, then the model update after each iteration is identical
to that in the adversary-free setup. This implies that any guarantees of convergence in the adversary-free case transfer
to the adversarial case.
Redundancy Bound We first study how much redundancy is required if we want to exactly recover the
correct sum of gradients per iteration in the presence of s adversaries.
Theorem 1. Suppose a selection of gradient allocation, encoding, and decoding mechanisms (A,E,D) can tolerate s
adversarial nodes. Then its redundancy ratio r must satisfy r ≥ 2s+ 1.
The above result is information–theoretic, meaning that regardless of how the compute node encodes
and how the PS decodes, each data sample has to be replicated at least 2s+ 1 times to defend against s
adversarial nodes.
Remark 3. Suppose that a tuple (A,E,D) can tolerate any s adversarial nodes. By Theorem 1, this implies that
on average, each compute node encodes at least (2s+ 1) d-dimensional vectors. Therefore, if the encoding has linear
complexity, then each encoder requires (2s + 1)d operations in the worst-case. If the decoder D has linear time
complexity, then it requires at least Pd operations in the worst case, as it needs to use the d-dimensional input from all
P compute nodes. This gives a computational cost of O(Pd) in general, which is significantly less than that of the
median approach in [BGS+17], which requires O(P 2(d+ logP )) operations.
Optimal Coding Schemes A natural question is, can we achieve the optimal redundancy bound with linear-time
encoding and decoding? More formally, can we design a tuple (A,E,D) that has redundancy ratio r = 2s+ 1
and computation complexity O((2s+ 1)d) at the compute node and O(Pd) at the PS? We give a positive
answer by presenting two coding approaches that match the above bounds. The encoding methods are
based on the fractional repetition code and the cyclic repetition codes in [TLDK17, RTTD17].
Fractional Repetition Code Suppose 2s + 1 divides P . The fractional repetition code (derived from
[TLDK17]) works as follows. We first partition the compute nodes into r = 2s+ 1 groups. We assign the
nodes in a group to compute the same sum of gradients. Let gˆ be the desired sum of gradients per iteration.
In order to decode the outputs returned by the compute nodes in the same group, the PS uses majority vote
to select one value. This guarantees that as long as fewer than half of the nodes in a group are adversarial,
the majority procedure will return the correct gˆ.
Formally, the repetition code (ARep ,ERep ,DRep) is defined as follows. The assignment matrix ARep is
given by
ARep =

1r×r 0r×r 0r×r · · · 0r×r 0r×r
0r×r 1r×r 0r×r · · · 0r×r 0r×r
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0r×r 0r×r 0r×r · · · 0r×r 1r×r
 .
The jth compute node first computes all its allocated gradients YRepj =
(
1dA
Rep
j,·
)
G. Its encoder function
simply takes the summation of all the allocated gradients. That is, ERepj (Y
Rep
j ) = Y
Rep
j 1P . It then sends
zj = E
Rep
j (Y
Rep
j ) to the PS.
The decoder works by first finding the majority vote of the output of each compute node that was
assigned the same gradients. For instance, since the first r compute nodes were assigned the same gradients,
it finds the majority vote of [z1, . . . ,zr]. It does the same with each of the blocks of size r, and then takes the
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sum of the P/r majority votes. We note that our decoder here is different compared to the one used in the
straggler mitigation setup of [TLDK17]. Our decoder follows the concept of majority decoding similarly to
[VN56, Pip88].
Formally, DRep is given by DRep(R) =
∑P
r
`=1Maj
(
R·,(`·(r−1)+1):(`·r)
)
, where Maj (·) denotes the majority
vote function and R is the d× P matrix received from all compute nodes. While a naive implementation of
majority vote scales quadratically with the number of compute nodes P , we instead use a streaming version
of majority vote [BM91], the complexity of which is linear in P .
Theorem 2. Suppose 2s+ 1 divides P . Then the repetition code (ARep ,ERep ,DRep) with r = 2s+ 1 can tolerate
any s adversaries, achieves the optimal redundancy ratio, and has linear-time encoding and decoding.
Cyclic Code Next we describe a cyclic code whose encoding method comes from [TLDK17] and is similar to
that of [RTTD17]. We denote the cyclic code, with encoding and decoding functions, by (ACyc ,ECyc ,DCyc).
The cyclic code provides an alternative way to tolerate adversaries in distributed setups. We will show
that the cyclic code also achieves the optimal redundancy ratio and has linear-time encoding and decoding.
Another difference compared to the repetition code is that in the cyclic code, the compute nodes will compute
and transmit complex vectors, and the decoding function will take as input these complex vectors.
To better understand the cyclic code, imagine that all P gradients we wish to compute are arranged
in a circle. Since there are P starting positions, there are P possible ways to pick a sequence consisting of
2s+ 1 clock-wise consecutive gradients in the circle. Assigning each sequence of gradients to each compute
node leads to redundancy ratio r = 2s+ 1. The allocation matrix for the cyclic code is ACyc , where the i row
contains r = 2s+ 1 consecutive ones, between position (i− 1)r+ 1 to i · r modulo B.
In the cyclic code, each compute node computes a linear combination of its assigned gradients. This can
be viewed as a generalization of the repetition code’s encoder. Formally, we construct some P × P matrix
W such that ∀j, `,ACycj,` 6= 0 implies Wj,` = 0. Let YCycj =
(
1dA
Cyc
j,·
)
G denote the gradients computed at
compute node j. The local encoding function ECycj is defined by E
Cyc
j (Y
Cyc
j ) = GW·,j . After performing
this local encoding, the jth compute node then sends zCycj , E
Cyc
j (Y
Cyc
j ) to the PS. Let Z
ACyc,ECyc,G ,
[zCyc1 ,z
Cyc
2 , · · · ,zCycP ]. Then one can verify from the definition of ECycj that ZA
Cyc,ECyc,G = GW. The received
matrix at the PS now becomes RCyc = ZA
Cyc,ECyc,G + N = GW + N.
In order to decode, the PS needs to detect which compute nodes are adversarial and recover the correct
gradient summation from the non-adversarial nodes. Methods to do the latter alone in the presence of
straggler nodes was presented in [TLDK17] and [RTTD17]. Suppose there is a function φ(·) that can compute
the adversarial node index set V . We will later construct φ explicitly. Let U be the index set of the non-
adversarial nodes. Suppose that the span of W·,U contains 1P . Thus, we can obtain a vector b by solving
W·,Ub = 1P . Finally, since U is the index set of non-adversarial nodes, for any j ∈ U , we must have nj = 0.
Thus, we can use RCyc·,U b = (GW + N)·,Ub = GW·,Ub = G1P . The decoder function is given formally in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Decoder Function DCyc.
Input : Received d× P matrix RCyc
Output : Desired gradient summation uCyc
V = φ(R) // Locate the adversarial node indexes.
U = {1,2, · · · , P} − V . // Non-adversarial node indexes
Find b by solving W·,Ub = 1P
Compute and return uCyc = R·,Ub
To make this approach work, we need to design a matrix W and the index location function φ(·) such that
(i) For all j, k, Aj,k = 0 =⇒ Wj,k = 0 and the span of W·,U contains 1P , and (ii) φ(·) can locate the adversarial
nodes.
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Let us first construct W. Let C be a P × P inverse discrete Fourier transformation (IDFT) matrix, i.e.,
Cjk =
1√
P
exp
(
2pii
P
(j − 1)(k− 1)
)
, j, k = 1,2, · · · , P.
Let CL be the first P − 2s rows of C and CR be the last 2s rows. Let αj be the set of row indices of the
zero entries in ACyc·,j , i.e., αj = {k : ACycj,k = 0}. Note that CL is a (P − 2s)× P Vandermonde matrix and
thus any P − 2s columns of it are linearly independent. Since |αj | = P − 2s− 1, we can obtain a P − 2s− 1-
dimensional vector qj uniquely by solving 0 =
[
qj 1
] · [CL]·,αj . Construct a P × (P − 2s − 1) matrix
Q ,
[
q1 q2 · · · qP
]
and a P × P matrix W , [Q 1P ] ·CL. One can verify that (i) each row of W has
the same support as the allocation matrix ACyc and (ii) the span of any P − 2s+ 1 columns of W contains 1P ,
summarized as follows.
Lemma 3. For all j, k, Aj,k = 0⇒Wj,k = 0. For any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s+ 1), the column span of
W·,U contains 1P .
The φ(·) function works as follows. Given the d× P matrix RCyc received from the compute nodes, we
first generate a 1× d random vector f ∼N (11×d, Id), and then compute [hP−2s, hP−2s−1, · · · , hP−1] , fRC†R1.
We then obtain a vector β = [β0, β1, · · · , βs−1]T by solving
hP−s−1 hP−s . . . hP−2
hP−s−2 hP−s−1 . . . hP−3
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hP−2s hP−s+1 . . . hP−s+1


β0
β1
...
βs−1
 =

hP−1
hP−2
...
hP−s
.
We then compute h` =
∑s−1
u=0 βuh`+u−s, where ` = 0,1, · · · , P − 2s − 1 and h` = hP+`. Once the vector
h , [h0, h1, · · · , hP−1] is obtained, we can compute the IDFT of h, denoted by t , [t0, t1, · · · , tP−1]. The
returned index set V = {j : tj+1 6= 0}. The following lemma shows the correctness of φ(·).
Lemma 4. Suppose N = [n1,n2, · · · ,nP ] satisfies |{j : ‖nj‖0 6= 0}| ≤ s. Then φ(RCyc) = φ(GW + N) = {j :
‖nj‖0 6= 0} with probability 1.
Finally we can show that the cyclic code can tolerate any s adversaries and also achieves redundancy
ratio and has linear-time encoding and decoding.
Theorem 5. The cyclic code (ACyc ,ECyc ,DCyc) can tolerate any s adversaries with probability 1 and achieves the
redundancy ratio lower bound. For d P , its encoding and decoding achieve linear-time computational complexity.
Note that the cyclic code requires transmitting complex vectors GW which potentially doubles the
bandwidth requirement. To handle this problem, one can transform the original real gradient G ∈ Rd×P into
a complex gradient Gˆ ∈ Cdd/2e×P by letting its ith component have real part Gi and complex part Gdd/2e+i.
Then the compute nodes only need to send GˆW. Once the PS recovers uˆCyc , Gˆ1P , it can simply sum the
real and imaginary parts to form the true gradient summation, i.e., uCyc = Re(uˆCyc) + Im(uˆCyc) = G1P .
4 Experiments
In this section we present an empirical study of DRACO and compare it to the median-based approach in
[CSX17] under different adversarial models and real distributed environments. The main findings are as
follows: 1) For the same training accuracy, DRACO is up to orders of magnitude faster compared to the
GM-based approach; 2) In some instances, the GM approach [CSX17] does not converge, while DRACO
converges in all of our experiments, regardless of which dataset, machine learning model, and adversary
attack model we use; 3) Although DRACO is faster than GM-based approaches, its runtime can sometimes
scale linearly with the number of adversaries due to the algorithmic redundancy needed to defend against
adversaries.
1† denotes transpose conjugate.
8
Implementation and Setup We compare vanilla mini-batch SGD to both DRACO-based mini-batch SGD
and GM-based mini-batch SGD [CSX17]. In mini-batch SGD, there is no data replication and each compute
node only computes gradients sampled from its partition of the data. The PS then averages all received
gradients and updates the model. In GM-based mini-batch SGD, the PS uses the geometric median instead
of average to update the model. We have implemented all of these in PyTorch [PGC+17] with MPI4py
[DPKC11] deployed on the m4.2/4/10xlarge instances in Amazon EC2 2. We conduct our experiments on
various adversary attack models, datasets, learning problems and neural network models.
Adversarial Attack Models We consider two adversarial models. First, we consider the “reversed gradient"
adversary, where adversarial nodes that were supposed to send g to the PS instead send −cg, for some c > 0.
Next, we consider a “constant adversary" attack, where adversarial nodes always send a constant multiple κ
of the all-ones vector to the PS with dimension equal to that of the true gradient. In our experiments, we set
c = 100 for the reverse gradient adversary, and κ = −100 for the constant adversary. In either setup, at each
iteration, s nodes are randomly selected to act as adversaries.
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Figure 3: Convergence rates of DRACO, GM, and vanilla mini-batch SGD, on (a) MNIST on FC, (b) MNIST
on LeNet, (c) CIFAR10 on ResNet-18, and (d) MR on CRN, all with reverse gradient adversaries; (e) MNIST
on FC, (f) MNIST on LeNet, (g) CIFAR10 on ResNet-18, and (h) MR on CRN, all with constant adversaries.
End-to-end Convergence Performance We first evaluate the end-to-end convergence performance of
DRACO, using both the repetition and cyclic codes, and compare it to ordinary mini-batch SGD as well as the
GM approach. The datasets and their associated learning models are summarized in Table 1. We use fully
connected (FC) neural networks and LeNet [LBBH98] for MNIST, ResNet-18 [HZRS16] for Cifar 10 [KH09],
and CNN-rand-non-static (CRN) model in [Kim14] for Movie Review (MR) [PL05].
The experiments were run on a cluster of 45 compute nodes instantiated on m4.2xlarge instances. At each
iteration, we randomly select s = 1,3,5 (2.2%, 6.7%, 11.1% of all compute nodes) nodes as adversaries. All
three methods are trained for 10,000 distributed iterations. Figure 3 shows how the testing accuracy varies
with training time. Tables 2, 3, and 4 give a detailed account of the speedups of DRACO compared to the GM
approach, where we run both systems until they achieve the same designated testing accuracy.
2https://github.com/hwang595/Draco
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Table 1: The datasets used, their associated learning models and corresponding parameters.
Dataset MNIST Cifar10 MR
# data points 70,000 60,000 10,662
Model FC/LeNet ResNet-18 CRN
# Classes 10 10 2
# Parameters 1,033k / 431k 1,1173k 154k
Optimizer SGD SGD Adam
Learning Rate 0.01 / 0.01 0.1 0.001
Batch Size 720 / 720 180 180
Table 2: Speedups (i.e., X times faster) of DRACO (Repetition/Cyclic Codes) over GM when using a fully-
connected neural network on the MNIST dataset. We run both methods until they reach the same specified
testing accuracy. In the table ‘const’ and ‘rev grad’ refer to the two types of adversarial updates.
Test Accuracy 80% 85% 88% 90%
2.2% const 3.4/2.7 3.5/2.8 4.8/3.9 4.1/3.1
6.7% const 2.7/2.0 4.1/3.1 6.0/4.6 5.6/4.1
11.1% const 2.9/2.2 4.8/3.7 6.1/4.7 5.3/3.8
2.2% rev grad 2.2/1.9 2.4/2.2 4.1/3.7 3.2/2.9
6.7% rev grad 3.1/2.5 3.3/3.1 5.5/4.8 4.5/3.7
11.1% rev grad 2.7/2.3 3.0/2.6 3.1/2.7 3.1/2.6
First, as expected, ordinary mini-batch may not converge even if there is only one adversary. Second,
under the reverse gradient adversary model, DRACO converges several times faster than the GM approach,
using both the repetition and cyclic codes. In fact, as shown in the speedup tables, both the repetition and
the cyclic code versions of DRACO achieve up to more than an order of magnitude speedup compared to the
GM approach. We suspect that this is because the computation of the GM is extremely expensive compared
to the encoding and decoding overhead of DRACO.
Table 3: Speedups of DRACO (with both repetition and cyclic codes) over GM when using ResNet-18 on
Cifar10. We run both methods until they reach the same specified testing accuracy. Here∞means that the
GM approach failed to converge to the same accuracy reached by DRACO.
Test Accuracy 80% 85% 88% 90%
2.2% rev grad 2.6/2.0 3.3/2.6 4.2/3.3 ∞/∞
6.7% rev grad 2.8/2.2 3.4/2.7 4.3/3.4 ∞/∞
11.1% rev grad 4.1/3.3 4.2/3.2 5.5/4.4 ∞/∞
Under the constant adversary model, the GM approach sometimes failed to converge while DRACO still
converged in all of our experiments. This reflects our theory, which shows that DRACO always returns a
model identical to the model trained by the ordinary algorithm in an adversary-free environment. One
reason why the GM approach may fail to converge is that by using the geometric median, it is actually losing
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Table 4: Speedups of DRACO (with both repetition and cyclic codes) over GM when using CRM on MR. We
run both methods until they reach the same specified testing accuracy.
Test Accuracy 95% 96% 98% 98.5%
2.2% rev grad 5.4/4.2 5.6/4.3 9.7/7.4 12/9.0
6.7% rev grad 6.4/4.5 6.3/4.5 11/8.1 19/13
11.1% rev grad 7.5/4.7 7.4/4.6 12/8 19/12
information about a subset of the gradients. Under the constant adversary model, the PS effectively gains no
information about the gradients computed by the adversarial nodes, and cannot recover the desired optimal
model.
Another reason that GM may not converge may be because theoretical convergence guarantees of GM
require certain assumptions on the underlying models, such as convexity. Since neural networks are generally
non-convex, we have no guarantees that GM converges in these settings. It is worth noting that GM may
also not converge if we were to use an algorithm such as L-BFGS or accelerated gradient descent, as the
choice of algorithm is separate from the underlying properties of the neural network models. Nevertheless,
DRACO still converges for such algorithms.
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Figure 4: Empirical Per Iteration Time Cost on Large Models with 11.1% adversarial nodes (a): reverse
gradient adversary on ResNet-152, (b): reverse gradient adversary on VGG-19, (c): reverse gradient adversary
on AlexNet, (d): constant adversary on ResNet-152, (e): constant adversary on VGG-19, (f): constant
adversary on AlexNet
11
Per iteration cost of DRACO We provide empirical per iteration costs of applying DRACO to three large
state-of-the-art deep networks, ResNet-152, VGG-19, and AlexNet [HZRS16, SZ14, KSH12]. The experiments
provided here are run on 46 real instances (45 compute nodes with 1 PS) on AWS EC2. For ResNet-152
and VGG-19, m4.4xlarge (equipped with 16 cores with 64 GB memory) instances are used while AlexNet
experiments are run on m4.10xlarge (40 cores with 160 GB memory) instances given the high memory
cost during training. We use a batch size of B = 180 and split the data among compute nodes. Therefore,
each compute node is assigned Bn = 4 data points per iteration. We use the Cifar10 dataset for all the
aforementioned networks. For networks like AlexNet that were not designed for small images, we resize
the Cifar10 images to fit the network. As shown in Figure 4, with s = 5, the encoding and decoding time
of DRACO can be several times larger than the computation time of ordinary SGD, though SGD may not
converge in adversarial settings. Nevertheless, DRACO is still several times faster than GM.
Table 5: Averaged Per Iteration Time Costs on ResNet-152 with 11.1% adversary
Time Cost (sec) Comp Comm Encode Decode
GM const 1.72 39.74 0 212.31
Rep const 20.81 39.36 0.24 7.74
SGD const 1.64 27.99 0 0.09
Cyclic const 23.08 39.36 5.94 6.64
GM rev grad 1.73 43.98 0 161.29
Rep rev grad 20.71 42.86 0.29 7.54
SGD rev grad 1.69 36.27 0 0.09
Cyclic rev grad 23.08 42.86 5.95 6.65
Table 6: Averaged Per Iteration Time Costs on VGG-19 with 11.1% adversary
Time Cost (sec) Comp Comm Encode Decode
GM const 0.26 12.47 0 74.63
Rep const 2.59 12.91 0.20 3.03
SGD const 0.25 6.9 0 0.03
Cyclic const 3.08 12.91 4.01 4.30
GM rev grad 0.26 14.57 0 39.02
Rep rev grad 2.55 14.66 0.20 3.04
SGD rev grad 0.25 7.15 0 0.03
Cyclic rev grad 3.07 14.66 4.02 3.65
Table 5, 6 and 7 provide the detailed cost of the runtime of each component of the algorithm in training
ResNet-152, VGG-19 and AlexNet, respectively. While the communication cost is high in both DRACO and
the GM method, the decoding time of the GM approach, i.e., its geometric median update at the PS, is
prohibitively high. Meanwhile, the encoding and decoding overhead of DRACO is relatively negligible in
these cases.
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Table 7: Averaged Per Iteration Time Costs on AlexNet with 11.1% adversarial nodes.
Time Cost (sec) Comp Comm Encode Decode
GM const 0.37 27.40 0 275.08
Rep const 4.16 30.71 0.67 10.65
SGD const 0.35 25.72 0 0.14
Cyclic const 3.67 30.71 13.55 12.54
GM rev grad 0.36 28.10 0 163.48
Rep rev grad 4.15 31.76 0.67 9.98
SGD rev grad 0.35 26.76 0 0.11
Cyclic rev grad 3.66 31.755 13.55 12.54
Effects of number of adversaries We also analyze how the number of adversaries affects the performance
of DRACO. We ran Cifar10 on ResNet-18 with 15 compute nodes, varying the number of adversaries s from 1
to 7. For these experiments, we used the constant adversary model. For the repetition code, we adapted
the group size based on s while in the cyclic code we always took 2s+ 1. Figure 5 shows the total runtime
cost of DRACO does not increase significantly as the number of adversaries increase. This is likely due to
the fact that even at s = 7, the communication cost (which is not affected by the number of stragglers) is the
dominant cost of the algorithm.
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Figure 5: Time Cost to Reach 70% Test set Accuracy with Cifar10 dataset run with ResNet-18 on cluster 15
computation nodes varying Percentage of Adversarial Nodes from 6.7% to 46.7% with Constant Adversary
(a) Repetition Code and (b) Cyclic Code
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this work we presented DRACO, a framework for robust distributed training via algorithmic redundancy.
DRACO is robust to arbitrarily malicious compute nodes, while being orders of magnitude faster than
state-of-the-art robust distributed systems. We give information–theoretic lower bounds on how much
redundancy is required to resist adversaries while maintaining the correct update rule, and show that DRACO
achieves this lower bound. There are several interesting future directions.
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First, DRACO is designed to output the same model with or without adversaries. However, slightly
inexact model updates often do not decrease performance noticeably. Therefore, we might ask whether we
can either (1) tolerate more stragglers or (2) reduce the computational cost of DRACO by only approximately
recovering the desired gradient summation. Second, while we give two relatively efficient methods for
encoding and decoding, there may be others that are more efficient for use in distributed setups.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity of proof, let us define a valid s-attack first.
Definition 3. N = [n1,n2, · · · ,nP ] is a valid s attack if and only if |{j : ‖nj‖0 6= 0}| ≤ s.
Now we prove theorem 1. Suppose (A,E,D) can resist s adversaries. The goal is to prove ‖A‖0 ≥
P (2s+ 1). In fact we can prove a slightly stronger version: ‖A·,i‖0 ≥ (2s+ 1) , i = 1,2, · · · ,B. Suppose for
some i, ‖A·,i‖0 = τ < (2s+ 1). Without loss of generality, assume that A1,i,A2,i,Aτ,i are non-zero. Let
G−i = [g1,g2, · · · ,gi−1,gi+1, · · · ,gP ]. Since (A,E,D) can protect against s adversaries, we have for any G,
D(ZA,E,G + N) = G1 = G−i1 + gi,
for any valid s-attack N. In particular, let g1i = 1d, g
i
2 = −1d, G1 = [g1,g2, · · · ,gi−1,g1i ,gi+1, · · · ,gP ], and
G2 = [g1,g2, · · · ,gi−1,g2i ,gi+1, · · · ,gP ]. Then for any valid s attack N1,N2,
D(ZA,E,G
1
+ N1) = G−i1P−1 + 1d.
and
D(ZA,E,G
2
+ N2) = G−i1P−1 − 1d.
Our goal is to find N1,N2 such that D(ZA,E,G
1
+ N1) = D(ZA,E,G
2
+ N2) which then will lead to a contradic-
tion. Construct N1 and N2 by
N1`,j =

[
ZA,E,N
2
]
`,j
−
[
ZA,E,N
1
]
`,j
, j = 1,2, · · · , d τ−12 e
0, otherwise
and
N2`,j =

[
ZA,E,N
1
]
`,j
−
[
ZA,E,N
2
]
`,j
, j = d τ−12 e, d τ−12 e+ 1, · · · , τ
0, otherwise
One can easily verify that N1,N2 are both valid s attack. Meanwhile, we have[
ZA,E,G
1
]
`,j
+ N1`,j =
[
ZA,E,G
2
]
`,j
+ N2`,j , j = 1,2, · · · , τ
due to the above construction of N1,N2. Note that Aj,i = 0 for all j > τ , which implies that for all compute
nodes with index j > τ , their encoder functions do not depend on the ith gradient. Since G1 and G2 only
differ in the ith gradient, the encoder function of any compute node with index j > τ should have the same
output. Thus, we have[
ZA,E,G
1
]
`,j
+ N1`,j =
[
ZA,E,G
1
]
`,j
=
[
ZA,E,G
2
]
`,j
=
[
ZA,E,G
2
]
`,j
+ N2`,j , j > τ
Hence, we have [
ZA,E,G
1
]
`,j
+ N1`,j =
[
ZA,E,G
2
]
`,j
+ N2`,j ,∀j
which means
ZA,E,G
1
+ N1 = ZA,E,G
2
+ N2
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Therefore, we have
D(ZA,E,G
1
+ N1) = D(ZA,E,G
2
+ N2)
and thus
G−11P−1 + 1d = D(ZA,E,G
1
+ N1) = D(ZA,E,G
2
+ N2) = G−11P−1 − 1d
This gives us a contradiction. Hence, the assumption is not correct and we must have ‖A·,i‖0 ≥ (2s+ 1) , i =
1,2, · · · , P . Thus, we must have ‖A‖0 ≥ (2s+ 1)P .
A direct but interesting corollary of this theorem is a bound on the number of adversaries DRACO can
resist.
Corollary 6. (A,E,D) can resist at most P−12 adversarial nodes.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, the redundancy ratio is at least 2s+ 1, meaning that every data point must
be replicated by at least 2s+ 1. Since there are P compute node in total, we must have 2s+ 1 ≤ P , which
implies s ≤ P−12 . Thus, (A,E,D) can resist at most P−12 adversaries.
In other words, at least a majority of the compute nodes must be non-adversarial.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Since there are at most s adversaries, there are at least 2s+ 1− s = s+ 1 non-adversarial compute nodes
in each group. Thus, performing majority vote on each group returns the correct gradient, and thus
the repetition code guarantees that the result is correct. The complexity at each compute node is clearly
O((2s+ 1)d) since each of them only computes the sum of (2s+ 1) d-dimensional gradients. For the decoder
at the PS, within each group of (2s+ 1) machine, it takes O((2s+ 1)d) computations to find the majority.
Since there are P(2s+1) groups, it takes in total O((2s+ 1)d P(2s+1) ) = O(Pd) computations. Thus, this achieves
linear-time encoding and decoding.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove that Aj,k = 0⇒Wj,k = 0.
Suppose Aj,k = 0 for some j, k. Then by definition k ∈ αj . By 0 =
[
qj 1
] · [CL]·,αj we have 0 =[
qj 1
]
[CL]·,k = Wj,k.
Next we prove that for any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s+ 1), the column span of W·,U contains 1.
This is equivalent to that for any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s+ 1), there exists a vector b such that
W·,Ub= 1. Now we show such b exists. Note that CL is a (P −2s)×P full rank Vandermonde matrix and thus
any P − 2s columns of CL are linearly independent. Let U¯ be the first P − 2s elements in U . Then all columns
of [CL]·,U¯ are linearly independent and thus [CL]·,U¯ is invertible. Let bU¯ , b¯ =
(
CL
U¯
)−1 [
0 0 · · · 0 1]T .
For any j 6∈ U¯ , let bj = 0. Then we have
WUb =
[
Q 1
]× [CL]·,U b
=
[
Q 1
]× [CL]·,U¯ b¯
=
[
Q 1
]× [CL]·,U¯ × [CL]−1·,U¯ [0 0 · · · 0 1]T
=
[
Q 1
][
0 0 · · · 0 1]T
= 1.
This completes the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We need a few lemmas first.
Lemma 7. Let a P -dimensional vector γ , [γ1, γ2, · · · , γP ]T = (fN)T . Then we have
Pr({j : γj 6= 0} = {j : ‖N·,j‖0 6= 0}) = 1.
Proof. Let us prove that
Pr(N·,j 6= 0}|γj 6= 0) = 1.
and
Pr(γj 6= 0|N·,j 6= 0}) = 1.
for any j. Combining those two equations we prove the lemma.
The first equation is straightforward. Suppose N·,j = 0. Then we immediately have γj = fN·,j = 0. For the
second one, note that f has entries drawn independently from the standard normal distribution. Therefore
we have that γj = fN·,j ∼ N (1TN·,j ,‖N·,j‖22). Since γj is a random variable with normal distribution, the
probability of it being any particular value is 0. In particular,
Pr(γj = 0|N·,j 6= 0}) = 0,
and thus
Pr(γj 6= 0|N·,j 6= 0}) = 1
which proves the second equation and finishes the proof.
Lemma 8. RCycC†R = NC
†
R.
Proof. By definition, RCycC†R = (GW + N) C
†
R =
(
G
[
Q 1
]
CL + N
)
C†R = G
[
Q 1
]
CLC
†
R + NC
†
R = NC
†
R. In
the last equation we use the fact that IDFT matrix is unitary and thus CLC
†
R = 0(P−2s)×(2s).
Lemma 9. Let a P -dimensional vector hˆ , [hˆ0, hˆ1, · · · , hˆP−1]T be the discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) of a
P -dimensional vector tˆ , [tˆ1, tˆ2, · · · , tˆP−1]T which has at most s non-zero elements, i.e., hˆ = C† tˆ and ‖t‖0 ≤ s. Then
there exists a s-dimensional vector βˆ , [βˆ0, βˆ1, · · · , βˆs−1]T , such that
hˆP−s−1 hˆP−s . . . hˆP−2
hˆP−s−2 hˆP−s−1 . . . hˆP−3
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s hˆP−s+1 . . . hˆP−s−1
 βˆ =

hˆP−1
hˆP−2
...
hˆP−s
. (A.1)
Furthermore, for any βˆ satisfying the above equations,
hˆ` =
s−1∑
u=0
βˆuhˆ`+u−s, (A.2)
always holds for all `, where hˆ` = hˆP+`.
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Proof. Let i1, i2, · · · , is be the index of the non-zero elements in tˆ. Let us define the location polynomial
p(ω) =
∏s
k=1(ω− e−
2pii
P ik) ,
∑s
k=0 θkω
k, where θs = 1. Let a s-dimensional vector βˆ∗ , −[θ0, θ1, · · · , θs−1]T .
Now we prove that βˆ = βˆ∗ is a solution to the system of linear equations (A.1). To see this, note that by
definition, for any λ, we have 0 = p(e−
2pii
P iλ) =
∑s
k=0 θke
− 2piiP iλk. Multiply both side by tˆiλe
− 2piiP iλη , we have
0 = tˆiλe
− 2piiP iλη
s∑
k=0
θke
− 2piiP iλk
= tˆiλ
s∑
k=0
θke
− 2piiP iλ(k+η).
Summing over λ, we have
0 =
s∑
λ=1
tˆiλ
s∑
k=0
θke
− 2piiP iλ(k+η)
=
s∑
k=0
θk
s∑
λ=1
tˆiλe
− 2piiP iλ(k+η).
By definition, hˆj = Cj,· tˆ = 1√P
∑P−1
k=0 e
− 2piiP jk tˆk = 1√P
∑s
λ=1 tˆiλe
− 2piiP iλj . Hence, the above equation becomes
0 =
s∑
k=0
θk
√
Phˆk+η
which is equivalent to
hˆs+η =
s−1∑
k=0
−θkhˆk+η
due to the fact that θs = 1. By setting η = −s+ P − 1,−s+ P − 2, · · · ,−s+ P − s, one can easily see that the
above equation becomes identical to the system of linear equations in (A.1) with βˆ = βˆ∗ =−[θ0, θ1, · · · , θs−1]T .
Now let us prove for any βˆ that satisfies equation (A.1), we have (A.2). Note that an equivalent form of
(A.2) is that the following system of linear equations

hˆP−s−1+` hˆP−s+` . . . hˆP−2+`
hˆP−s−2+` hˆP−s−1+` . . . hˆP−3+`
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+` hˆP−s+1+` . . . hˆP−s−1+`
 βˆ =

hˆP−1+`
hˆP−2+`
...
hˆP−s+`
 (A.3)
holds for ` = 0,1,2 · · · , P − 1. We prove this by induction. When ` = 1, this is true since βˆ satisfies the system
of linear equations in (A.1). Assume it holds for ` = µ, i.e.,
hˆP−s−1+µ hˆP−s+µ . . . hˆP−2+µ
hˆP−s−2+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−3+µ
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ hˆP−s+1+µ . . . hˆP−s−1+µ
 βˆ =

hˆP−1+µ
hˆP−2+µ
...
hˆP−s+µ

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Now we need to prove it also holds when ` = µ+ 1, i.e.,
hˆP−s−1+µ+1 hˆP−s+µ+1 . . . hˆP−2+µ+1
hˆP−s−2+µ+1 hˆP−s−1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−3+µ+1
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ+1 hˆP−s+1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−s−1+µ+1
 βˆ =

hˆP−1+µ+1
hˆP−2+µ+1
...
hˆP−s+µ+1
.
First, since both βˆ, βˆ∗ satisfy the induction assumption, we must have
hˆP−s−1+µ hˆP−s+µ . . . hˆP−2+µ
hˆP−s−2+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−3+µ
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ hˆP−s+1+µ . . . hˆP−s−1+µ
(βˆ − βˆ∗) = 0s.
Due to the induction assumption, one can verify that
[θs−1, θs−2, · · · , θ0]

hˆP−s−1+µ hˆP−s+µ . . . hˆP−2+µ
hˆP−s−2+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−3+µ
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ hˆP−s+1+µ . . . hˆP−s−1+µ
 = [hˆP−s+µ hˆP−s+µ+1 · · · hˆP−2+µ+1],
and thus we have[
hˆP−s+µ hˆP−s+µ+1 · · · hˆP−2+µ+1
]
(βˆ − βˆ∗)
=[θs−1, θs−2, · · · , θ0]

hˆP−s−1+µ hˆP−s+µ . . . hˆP−2+µ
hˆP−s−2+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−3+µ
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ hˆP−s+1+µ . . . hˆP−s−1+µ
(βˆ − βˆ∗) = 0.
Hence,[
hˆP−s+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−1+µ
]
βˆ
=
[
hˆP−s+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−1+µ
]
βˆ∗ +
[
hˆP−s+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−1+µ
]
(βˆ − βˆ∗) = hˆP+µ = hˆP−1+µ+1.
Furthermore, by induction assumption, we have
hˆP−s−2+µ+1 hˆP−s−1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−3+µ+1
hˆP−s−3+µ+1 hˆP−s−2+µ+1 . . . hˆP−4+µ+1
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ+1 hˆP−s+1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−s+1+µ+1
 βˆ =

hˆP−s−1+µ hˆP−s−2+µ . . . hˆP−2+µ
hˆP−s−2+µ hˆP−s−1+µ . . . hˆP−3+µ
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−(2s−1)+µ hˆP−s+µ . . . hˆP−s+µ
 βˆ
=

hˆP−1+µ
hˆP−2+µ
...
hˆP−(s−1)+µ
 =

hˆP−2+(µ+1)
hˆP−3+(µ+1)
...
hˆP−s+(µ+1)
.
Combing those two result we have proved
hˆP−s−1+µ+1 hˆP−s+µ+1 . . . hˆP−2+µ+1
hˆP−s−2+µ+1 hˆP−s−1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−3+µ+1
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s+µ+1 hˆP−s+1+µ+1 . . . hˆP−s−1+µ+1
 βˆ =

hˆP−1+µ+1
hˆP−2+µ+1
...
hˆP−s+µ+1
.
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By induction, the equation A.3 holds for all ` = 0,1, · · · , P − 1. Equation A.3 immediately finishes the
proof.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 4. By Lemma 7, for the P -dimensional vector γ = (fN)T , we have
Pr({j : γj 6= 0} = {j : ‖N·,j‖0 6= 0}) = 1,
Since there are at most s adversaries, the number of non-zero columns in N is at most s and hence there
are at most s non-zero elements in γ, i.e., ‖γ‖0 ≤ s, with probability 1. Now consider the case when ‖γ‖0 ≤ s.
First note that [hP−2s, hP−2s+1, · · · , hP−1] = fRCycC†R = fNC†R = γTC†R, where the second equation is due
to Lemma 8. Now let us construct hˆ = [hˆ0, hˆ1, · · · , hˆP−1]T by hˆ = C†γ. Note that C is symmetric and thus
C† =
[
C†
]T . One can easily verify that hˆ` = h`, ` = P − 2s,P − 2s+ 1, · · · , P − 1. Therefore, the equation
hP−s−1 hP−s . . . hP−2
hP−s−2 hP−s−1 . . . hP−3
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hP−2s hP−s+1 . . . hP−s+1


β0
β1
...
βs−1
 =

hP−1
hP−2
...
hP−s

becomes 
hˆP−s−1 hP−s . . . hˆP−2
hˆP−s−2 hˆP−s−1 . . . hˆP−3
. . . . . .
. . .
...
hˆP−2s hˆP−s+1 . . . hˆP−s+1


β0
β1
...
βs−1
 =

hˆP−1
hˆP−2
...
hˆP−s

which always has a solution. Assume we find one solution β¯ = [β¯0, β¯1, · · · , β¯P−1]T . By the second part of
Lemma 9, we have
hˆ` =
s−1∑
u=0
β¯uhˆ`+u−s,∀`.
Now we prove by induction that h` = hˆ`, ` = 0,1, · · · , P − 1.
When ` = 0, we have
hˆ0 =
s−1∑
u=0
β¯uhˆu−s =
s−1∑
u=0
β¯uhu−s = h0
where the second equation is due to the fact that [hP−2s, hP−2s−1, · · · , hP−1] = [hˆP−2s, hˆP−2s−1, · · · , hˆP−1]
and hˆP+` = hˆ`, hP+` = h` (by definition).
Assume that for ` ≤ µ, hˆ` = h`.
When ` = µ+ 1, we have
hˆµ+1 =
s−1∑
u=0
β¯uhˆµ+1+u−s =
s−1∑
u=0
β¯uhµ+1+u−s = hµ+1
where the second equation is because of the induction assumption for ` ≤ µ, hˆ` = h`.
Thus, we have h` = hˆ` for all `, which means h = hˆ = C†γ. Thus t, the IDFT of h, becomes t = Ch =
CC†γ = γ. Then the returned Index Set V = {j : ej+1 6= 0} = {j : γj 6= 0}. By Lemma 7, with probability 1,
{j : γj 6= 0} = {j : ‖nj‖0 6= 0}. Therefore, we have with probability 1, V = {j : ‖nj‖0 6= 0}, which finishes the
proof.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
We first prove the correctness of the cyclic code. By Lemma 4, the set U contains the index of all non-
adversarial compute nodes with probability 1. By Lemma 3, there exists b such that W·,Ub = 1. Therefore,
uCyc = RCyc·,U b = (GW + N)·,Ub = GW·,Ub = G1P . Thus, The cyclic code (A
Cyc ,ECyc ,DCyc) can recover the
desired gradient and hence resist any ≤ s adversaries with probability 1.
Next we show the efficiency of the cyclic code. By the construction of ACyc and W, the redundancy ratio
is 2s+ 1 which reaches the lower bound. Each compute node needs to compute a linear combination of the
gradients of the data it holds, which needsO((2s+ 1)d) computations. For the PS, the detection function φ(·)
takes O(d) (generating the random vector f) + O(dP + 2Ps) (computing fRC†R) + O(s2) (solving the Toeplitz
system of linear equations in (A.1) ) + O((P − 2s)s) (computing h`, ` = 0,1,2, · · · , P − 2s− 1 ) + O(P logP )
(computing the DFT of h ) + O(P ) (examining the non-zero elements of t ) = O(d+ dP + 2Ps+ s2 + (P −
2s)s+P logP +P ) =O(dP +Ps+P logP ). Finding the vector b takesO(P 3) (by simply constructing b via
[CL]·,U¯ , though better algorithms may exist). The recovering equation R·,Ub takes O(dP ). Thus, in total, the
decoder at the PS takes O(dP + P 3 + P logP ). When d P , i.e., d = Ω(P 2), this becomes O(dP ). Therefore,
(ACyc ,ECyc ,DCyc) also achieves linear-time encoding and decoding.
B Streaming Majority Vote Algorithm
In this section we present the Boyer—Moore majority vote algorithm [BM91], which is an algorithm that
only needs computation linear in the size of the sequence.
Algorithm 2 Streaming Majority Vote.
Input :n items I1, I2, · · · , In
Output : The majority of the n items
Initialize an element Ma = I1 and a counter Counter = 0.
for i = 1 to n do
if Counter == 0 then
Ma = Ii.
Counter = 1.
else if Ma == Ii then
Counter = Counter + 1.
else
Counter = Counter− 1.
end
end
Return Ma.
Clearly this algorithm runs in linear time and it is known that if there is a majority item then the algorithm
finally will return it [BM91].
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